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Communists on the Brain: 
U.S. Intervention in the  
Dominican Republic
William Jarrod Smitherman
I
With the free Republics of Latin America, I have always felt—and my country has 
always felt—very special ties of interest and affection…Together we share and 
shape the destiny of the new world.1
On April 24, 1965, violence erupted in the Dominican Republic. This small 
Caribbean nation was no stranger to violence or political upheaval. Only 
four years before, it had witnessed the assassination of Raphael Trujillo, 
leader of the oppressive regime in power since 1930. Juan Bosch, who 
was elected President in 1962, lasted only seven months in office before 
being overthrown himself. In the wake of Bosch’s departure, a military 
triumvirate became the ruling authority in the Dominican Republic. That 
governing body also soon lost support, and in April 1965, various groups 
opposed to Donald Reid Cabral, head of the Triumvirate, staged a revolt, 
ostensibly to restore the deposed Juan Bosch to power.
 The Dominican Republic is located approximately eight hundred 
miles from the coast of the United States. Partly because of this proximity, 
America has had a long history of intervening in Dominican affairs. 
However, after the adoption of the Good Neighbor Policy by the Franklin 
Roosevelt administration, the U.S. had avoided direct intervention in 
Dominican affairs. But only three days after the revolt began, President 
1  Lyndon Johnson, “State of the Union Address, January 4, 1965.” Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States, Book I. (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1966), 3.
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Lyndon Johnson ordered U.S. troops to land there. At first, the number of 
American soldiers was small. On April 28, 1965, there were only about 500 
U.S. troops on the island under the guise of a rescue mission to evacuate 
American citizens, embassy officials, and other foreign nationals from 
what the administration called a “grave situation.”2 Less than a week 
later, however, there were twenty-three thousand U.S. soldiers stationed 
there, and Johnson had decided intervention was necessary to prevent a 
communist takeover. 
The Dominican Revolt of 1965 created a crisis of American policy 
by revealing the incompatibility of the Good Neighbor Policy with 
the Monroe Doctrine and the Containment Policy in Latin America. In 
practice, the U.S. had abandoned the Good Neighbor Policy, but continued 
to proclaim its adherence. To save face and preserve some semblance of 
following its own policies, the administration was forced to play a verbal 
shell game to justify its decisions. The situation in the Dominican Republic 
was not a total failure of policy as some have suggested.3 Nor was it 
the fault of the embassy.4 American policy in the Dominican Republic 
was at a crossroads created by the Cold War climate, not because the 
administration did not know what to do, but because it needed to carry 
out actions that could be justified by contradictory policies—America 
needed to intervene without being regarded as interventionists.
The Monroe Doctrine has served as a cornerstone of American 
foreign policy in Latin America since it was first adopted in 1823. It rejects 
the legitimacy of European influence in Latin American nations. As 
2  Lyndon Johnson, “The President’s News Conference of April 27, 1965,” Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States, Book I, 451.
3  Theodore Draper, The Dominican Revolt: A Case Study in American Policy. (New York: 
Commentary, 1968), 5; Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis: The 1965 Constitutionalist Revolt 
and American Intervention, trans. Lawrence Lipson, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978), 177-178.
4  Draper, The Dominican Revolt, 5.
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originally constructed, the policy was meant to prevent former European 
colonial masters from reasserting control over Latin American countries 
that had gained independence and to prevent foreign nations from 
“gain[ing] a foothold in adjoining territories.”5 Of course, the Monroe 
Doctrine appealed to U.S. self-interest. Ignoring the autonomy of Latin 
American countries, the doctrine “presumes that Latin American and 
Caribbean people neither have the right, nor…the critical faculties to opt 
rationally and intelligently for an economic or political system not molded 
on that of the United States.”6 Rather, America has considered this side 
of the Atlantic to be its domain, and thus the doctrine has provided the 
justification for U.S. intervention in Latin America throughout history.7
Eventually, Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy superseded this 
activism, and non-intervention became the preferred policy for a brief 
period. Post-World War II conditions, however, intensified international 
tensions and occasioned a new general foreign policy. Initially created to 
prevent the spread of communism in Europe, the policy of containment 
became the guiding principle of Cold War foreign policy. The Cold 
War policy of containing communism, however, contradicted the Good 
Neighbor Policy being employed in Latin America. It is through this Cold 
War Containment lens that the U.S. response to events in the Dominican 
Republic must be viewed.
The primary failure of U.S. policy was that a clear and specific 
policy toward the Dominican Republic and the particular conditions 
which existed within it was nonexistent. The U.S. lacked a policy that 
could rectify the incompatibility of broad U.S. policy objectives. Embassy 
5  James L. Dietz, “Destabilization and Intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean,” 
Latin American Perspectives 11, no. 3 (Summer 1984): 3.
6  Dietz, “Destabilization and Intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean,” 5; William 
Kamman, “U.S.-Latin American Relations.” OAH Magazine of History 7, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 21.
7  Dietz, “Destabilization and Intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean,” 4.
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officials had warned of the dangers of these shortcomings well before 
the 1965 revolt. In 1964, the embassy warned the State Department 
that, “it is time we sat down to map out a program for the Dominican 
Republic which is geared to developments that are occurring there.”8 The 
report further stated that events in the Dominican Republic could lead 
to “deterioration in political and economic conditions which could lead 
to a Castro-type takeover.” It was important that the United States “not 
simply react to the situation as it develops,” but rather have a plan in 
place to prevent such an occurrence or limit its success.9 The warning went 
unheeded, and when the situation fell apart, America’s response seemed 
reactionary, frenzied, and inconsistent. The administration was constantly 
changing the direction of public discourse to keep up with changing 
events and justify policy decisions.
II
The American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment 
of another Communist government in the Western Hemisphere. This was the 
unanimous view of all the American nations when, in January 1962, they 
declared, and I quote: “The principles of communism are incompatible with the 
principles of the inter-American system.” That is what our beloved President 
John F. Kennedy meant when, less than a week before his death, he told us: “We 
in this hemisphere must also use every resource at our command to prevent the 
establishment of another Cuba in this hemisphere.”10
The biggest influence on America’s policy toward the Dominican 
Republic was an event that had occurred elsewhere in the Caribbean six 
years earlier. America’s primary focus in policy toward the Dominican 
8  “Memorandum from the Presidents Special Assistant (Dungan) to the Assistant Secretary 
of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann), February 6, 1964,” Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1964-1968 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), XXXII: 7.
9 Ibid., 8.
10  Lyndon Johnson, “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Situation 
in the Dominican Republic, May 2, 1965,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 
Book I, 472.
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Republic was in the context of preventing a “second Cuba,” a fear that 
was somewhat exaggerated but not entirely fallacious.11 Theodore Draper 
states that from the beginning “the U.S., on the basis of ambiguous 
evidence, assumed…that the revolution was communist dominated, 
or would certainly become so.”12 Actually, U.S. assumptions about 
communism in the Dominican Republic were in existence long before 
the beginning of the revolt. Upon taking office, President Johnson 
proclaimed that “The communists are hard at work to dominate the less 
developed nations of…Latin America,” and numerous reports indicated 
an inclination for policy makers to be suspicious of a communist plot.13 
This assumption was part of a long term Cold War mentality, 
and fears of communist expansion dominated foreign policy decisions. 
Long before the 1965 revolt, intelligence officials warned that “Castro 
will probably supply [subversive leftist leaders] clandestinely with 
small amounts of material aid, and they may attract the support of other 
Dominican elements, including erstwhile moderates.” While evidence at 
that time was deficient, the report stated that “over the longer run, the 
present limited threat of insurgency could increase sharply.”14 Conditions 
in the Dominican Republic did little to alleviate these concerns. The 
Dominican people “are seething with unrest and frustration…The poor 
and unemployed … appear to be steadily drifting leftward in their 
11  Abraham Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1972), 26, 153; Jerome Slater, Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and Dominican 
Intervention (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), x; Jonathan Hartlyn, “The Dominican 
Republic: The Legacy of Intermittent Engagement,” in, Exporting Democracy, ed. Abraham 
Lowenthal (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 76. Lowenthal, “The 
United States and the Dominican Republic to 1965: Background to Intervention.” Caribbean 
Studies 10, no. 2 (July 1970): 49-50.
12  Draper, The Dominican Revolt, 65.
13  Lyndon Johnson, “Special Message to Congress on Foreign Aid, January 14, 1965.” Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Book I, 44.
14  “Special National Intelligence Estimate 86.2-64, January 17, 1964,” FRUS, 1964-1968, 
XXXII: 1, 5-7.
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sympathies. They are, of course, on [the] receiving end of [a] heavy stream 
of radio and word of mouth propaganda from [the] extreme left.”15 Even 
when not germane to the issue at hand, officials were so focused on 
preventing a second Cuba that they saw communism everywhere. “Point 
is, rumors, whether or not based on fact, have caused [a] split in armed 
forces unity—a very effective Communist [strategy],” stated one report on 
the discord in the Dominican armed forces.16 When the revolt began, and 
it appeared that some of the opposition factions had ties to the extreme 
left, conditions seemed to fit into the American policy paradigm perfectly. 
James Dietz states:
The post-Second World War foreign power obsession has been, 
of course, the need to contain the spread of communism and 
socialism—systems that, in this view, expand only under the 
direction of Moscow or Peking, or Havana…and that do so 
only by infiltrating other governments either through hard line 
agents under international party discipline, or through the more 
dangers avenue of fellow travelers and innocent and naive liberals 
[i.e. Bosch] who unwittingly serve the international communist 
conspiracy by favoring communist goals like agrarian reform, 
anti-poverty programs, rights of unions to organize, political and 
human rights, income redistribution, and the like.17
Since the ascension of the Triumvirate, the “basic thrust of U.S. 
policy toward the Dominican Republic … remained the same: to prevent 
any threat to U.S. security by promoting immediate stability and guarding 
against ‘Castro-Communist’ gains.”18 The failure to prevent a communist 
takeover in Cuba was a huge black eye for America. With that defeat 
at the forefront of their minds, administration officials’ perceptions of 
reality became skewed to the point of paranoia. Every situation was 
15  “Telegram from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, May 
21, 1964,” FRUS, 1964-1968, XXXII: 12-13.
16  “Telegram from the Joint Army/Navy/Air Force Attaches to the Chief of Naval 
Operations (McDonald), August 26, 1964,” FRUS, 1964-1968, XXXII: 36.
17  Dietz, “Destabilization and Intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean,” 4-5.
18  Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 30.
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seen through “red” glasses, and officials read much communism into 
the situation. Bruises from the Cuban Revolution not only influenced 
America’s approach to the Dominican Republic, it also shaped how the 
U.S. would intervene. The failure of the Bay of Pigs incident weighed 
heavily on Johnson and his advisors as they considered the direct role of 
American forces in the Dominican Republic.19 Officials were very cautious 
about how the military should be involved. Certainly there would need 
to be evidence to justify intervention, and intervention should not have 
appeared unilateral. Regardless, officials recognized that, whatever action 
was taken, “we shall be misunderstood, and we shall be attacked by those 
who want revolution immediately and by those who want no changes at 
all.”20
 Critics of intervention have been outspoken in their assertion that 
the administration’s painting of the rebels as communistic was “one of 
the most cynical deceptions of our time.”21 The communist threat, they 
argued, was invented by those seeking to retain power, as a means to 
enlist the United States to prop up their crumbling regime.22 Theodore 
Draper argues that to interpret events as being orchestrated by Castro 
was inane. Castroites, “flushed with a lighting victory over the entire 
Dominican military” would not have missed the “golden opportunity 
to wage a holy war of ‘national liberation’ against direct U.S. military 
intervention.”23 The assertion, however, “that the whole affair was a 
hoax or cover up is…incorrect.” There was sufficient evidence to warrant 
19  Ibid., 107.
20  “Telegram from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, May 
21, 1964,” FRUS, 1964-1968, XXXII: 18.
21  Draper, The Dominican Revolt, 28. See also Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic: A 
National History (Princeton, NJ: Markus Weiner, 1998).
22  Piero Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis, 179.
23  Draper, The Dominican Revolt, 112-113.
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U.S. suspicions of communist involvement.24 Although the extent of 
communist infiltration could not be ascertained, American officials had 
no doubt that “a modest number of hard-core Communist leaders in 
Santo Domingo [had] managed by superior training and tactics to win for 
themselves a position of considerable influence in the revolt.”25 One month 
after American soldiers arrived, Johnson affirmed that “a well-trained, 
disciplined band of Communists was prevented from destroying the 
hopes of Dominican democracy.”26 He conveniently ignored that the only 
democratically elected leader of the Dominican Republic was prevented 
from returning to power by the U.S. intervention.
 Reports from intelligence agents, embassy officials, and other 
observers confirmed the presence of communist operatives. Consistent 
with the idea that the “high motives [of the initial revolt had] been 
misused by a small band of conspirators who receive their directions from 
abroad,” former ambassador John Bartlow Martin reported that rebels 
had distributed weapons to the populace, including a large number of 
communists. 27 Intelligence agents witnessed known communist operatives 
participating in the rebel movement.28 Administration officials reported 
that armed bands of communists were roaming the streets at night and 
terrorizing citizens, even firing on the American Embassy while the 
Ambassador was contacting Washington via telephone from under a 
desk.29 These statements served a number of purposes. First, they provided 
24  Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, 35-36.
25  Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, May 7, 1965, FRUS, 1964-
1968, XXXII: 139.
26  “Commencement Address at Baylor University, May 28, 1965,” Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States, Book I, 594.
27  “Radio and Television Report to the American People…, May 2, 1965,” 472.
28  John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to 
the Civil War, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), 647, 650, 673.
29  Telephone Conversation Between the Undersecretary of State of Economic Affairs (Mann) 
and President Johnson, April 27, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, XXXII: 63; Lyndon Johnson, “The 
Presidents News Conference of June 1, 1965.” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 
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the necessary justification for sending troops. Second, the frightening and 
bloody tales helped sway American public opinion to support further 
U.S. actions. Finally, these stories motivated Congress to loosen its purse 
strings and fund these and other military operations intended to prevent 
the spread of communism around the world. Johnson told Congress 
that “each Member…who supports this request [for additional military 
appropriations in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic] is voting to 
continue our effort to try to halt Communist aggression.”30
 Continued intelligence operations and observations after the 
initial American deployment yielded further evidence of communist 
involvement, and the embassy increasingly emphasized the signs of 
communist influence. Even writers critical of intervention admit that there 
was communist involvement in the revolt.31 While communist operatives 
may have been participating, even constituting an important element in 
the Constitutionalist camp, there was very little evidence “linking any 
Communist country to the planning, organization, or direction of the 
movement.”32 Ambassador Martin had no doubt that there was a danger 
of communist takeover. His reports paint a much more violent picture 
than reported in historical accounts of journalists. He corroborated reports 
that many men with known communist ties were active at rebel strong 
points and also reported that communist operatives knew that they 
would not succeed if the American military intervened and discussed 
withdrawing from overt participation to obscure their involvement.33
Book II (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1966), 617.
30 Lyndon Johnson, “Remarks to Committee Members on the Need for Additional 
Appropriations for Military Purposes in Viet-Nam and the Dominican Republic, May 4, 
1965,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Book I: 485.
31  Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 78, 87, 97; Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis, 229-230; 
Draper, The Dominican Crisis, 66-67.
32  Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, 38-39.
33  Martin, Overtaken by Events, 673-676, 686, 705; Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 129.
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 At the very least, what started out as a legitimate attempt 
to establish democracy was “superseded by…evil forces.” Johnson 
maintained that “Communist leaders, many of them trained in Cuba, 
seeing a chance to increase disorder, to gain a foothold, [had] joined the 
revolution.”34 American intentions in the Dominican Republic were “in 
keeping with the principles of the inter-American system…to prevent 
another Communist state in this hemisphere.”35 Of course, as time 
progressed, further evidence of communist involvement was scarce, 
putting Johnson on the defensive, yet again. The President was forced 
to back away from some of the bold pronouncements.36 Responding to 
reporters’ inquiries, President Johnson said:
I will say that the threat was greater before 21,000 Americans 
arrived there. It always is. The Communists did not, in our 
judgment, originate this revolution, but they joined it and they 
participated in it. They were active in it, and in a good many 
places they were in charge of it…We think that following the 
action that this nation took—it served a very good purpose and 
some of the men who had originally participated in the revolution, 
and had to take asylum, retuned and more moderate forces took 
leadership—the Communist elements have not been so active, 
although their presence is still noted hour by hour.37
Historian Abraham Lowenthal agrees that as long as U.S. troops were 
present, the danger of communist takeover was dramatically reduced.38
34  “Radio and Television Report to the American People…, May 2, 1965,” 471.
35  Ibid., 473.
36  Draper, The Dominican Revolt, 138.
37  “The President’s News Conference of June 1, 1965,” 613-614.
38  Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 129.
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III
We are going to have to really set up that government down there, run it, and 
stabilize it some way or another. This Bosch is no good.39
 
To complicate matters, America was somewhat unsure about which side 
to support. From one perspective, the U.S. should have supported the 
return of the legitimately elected Juan Bosch. They chose not to do so, 
however. Thus America once again found itself at the crossroads of two 
incompatible policies—protecting and promoting democracy throughout 
Latin America and preventing the spread of communism there as well. 
Much of the U.S. response stemmed from a distrust of former President 
Juan Bosch.40 Bosch was elected President of the Dominican Republic in 
1962, but Americans interpreted his ascension as bringing “into office a 
Dominican regime … eager to assert its sovereignty.”41 Bosch, they felt, 
would be less likely to succumb to American influence. While the U.S. had 
supported the Bosch regime during its brief tenure, it did so cautiously, 
suspicious of Bosch’s ties to leftists. Before his overthrow, American 
officials expressed concerns about Bosch’s commitment to American 
principles. Ambassador Bennett stated that, “my own feeling is that Bosch 
is basically anti-American.”42 
Despite his legitimacy, America failed to support Bosch in 1963. 
Instead, America allowed a regime with a much stronger anti-communist 
stance to seize control.43 As early as January of 1964 intelligence officials 
pointed to Bosch’s reluctance to stand up to communist intrusions. In 
39  “Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
(Mann) and President Johnson, April 26, 1965,” FRUS, 1964-1968, XXXII: 62.
40  Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, 25.
41  Abraham Lowenthal, “The United States and the Dominican Republic to 1965,” 38.
42  “Letter from the Ambassador to the Dominican Republic (Bennett) to the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann), February 2, 1965,” FRUS, 1964-1968, 
XXXII: 54.
43  Draper, The Dominican Revolt, 8.
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their view, “Bosch reacted vigorously against Communists and Castroists 
only when he thought they posed direct challenges to his own position.”44 
Abraham Lowenthal states, “Since the fundamental American objective 
in the Dominican Republic was never really to help Bosch or even rule 
his country, but rather to prevent a ‘second Cuba,’ the U.S. government’s 
reaction when Bosch was overthrown was not surprising.”45
 The 1965 revolt began as an attempt to restore Bosch to power 
and was supported by a number of groups—many with communist 
inclinations—who banded together to oppose Reid.46 Already weary 
of Bosch and fearful of the spread of communism in Latin America, 
the U.S. was reluctant to support his return to power, and some 
officials intentionally cast aspersions that he and the communists were 
indistinguishable.47 Reported communist involvement in the revolt 
only served to increase American concern about Bosch. There was some 
question as to whether Bosch had “sold out to the Communists before 
the revolt…[or whether] the revolt was co-opted by communist agents.”48 
Though he was living under American protection in Puerto Rico, “America 
came to treat Bosch’s party as if it had a permanent burden of proof that it 
was not seeking or even accepting Castro-Communist support.”49
 Whether Bosch was directly involved with a communist plot was 
undetermined, but American officials still expressed doubts about him. 
Even if he wasn’t privy to communist plots, American officials did not 
“think that [he] understands the Communist danger … [W]e are afraid…
that if he gets back in, he will have so many [communists] around him; 
44  “Special National Intelligence Estimate 86.2-64, January 17, 1964,” FRUS, 1964-1968, 
XXXII: 2. 
45  Lowenthal, “The United States and the Dominican Republic to 1965,” 52.
46  Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, 19-20.
47  Draper, The Dominican Revolt, 86-88.
48  Ibid., 133.
49  Lowenthal, “The United States and the Dominican Republic to 1965,” 54.
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and they are so much smarter than he is, that before you know it, they’d 
begin to take over.”50 As far as America was concerned, Bosch would 
be used and discarded by the Communist operatives once the revolt 
successfully overthrew the Triumvirate.51 At the same time, despite 
America’s inclination to support Reid Cabral, it was clear that he would 
not come out on top of the revolt. Officially, the United States made a 
“strong effort to avoid tying ourselves too directly to … any one group,” 
all-the-while working behind the scenes to support a military junta.52
IV
In those early terrible hours, we did what we had to do. Remembering Simon 
Bolivar’s admonition that “to hesitate is destruction,” as your President I did 
what I had to do.53
From the beginning, the administration had been sensitive to the 
principle of non-intervention. The official line of American policy had 
to be expressed in such a way as to simultaneously meet multiple goals 
without revealing their incompatibilities. Johnson needed to intervene in 
the Dominican Republic without having the appearance of meddling in 
the nation’s affairs. In truth, however, the United States had abandoned 
the principle of non-intervention long before 1965.54 America had 
intervened in Latin American affairs a number of times since the adoption 
of the Good Neighbor Policy—the policy of containment trumped 
non-intervention every time.55 Statements made by the administration 
50  “Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
(Mann) and President Johnson, April 27, 1965,” 65.
51  “Transcript of Teleconference Between the Department of State and the Embassy in the 
Dominican Republic, April 29, 1965,” FRUS, 1964-1968, XXXII: 95.
52  “Telegram from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, May 
21, 1964,” FRUS, 1964-1968, XXXII: 14.
53  “Commencement Address at Baylor University, May 28, 1965,” 593.
54  Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 24.
55  Hartlyn, “The Dominican Republic,” 69-70.
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and U.S. actions elsewhere in the world gave clues as to the nature 
of American behavior toward the Dominican Republic had any crisis 
developed. President Johnson left little doubt as to American intentions 
four months before the revolt in his State of the Union Address: “We are 
prepared to live as good neighbors with all, but we cannot be indifferent 
to acts deigned to injure our interest, our citizens, or our establishments 
abroad.”56 
Despite claims to the contrary, behind closed doors U.S. officials 
made no effort to deceive themselves. They were “quite open on the phone 
about their right to promote military, diplomatic, and political victories…
while pretending to be neutral on all of these fronts.”57 America had, and 
would continue to, exert influence over the situation. Carefully watching 
the situation, officials hoped that a military junta would emerge to put 
down any communist elements, but expressed concerns that “there are 
only a few Dominicans qualified to help run the government. When 
you are that thin it does not take much to upset everything.”58 Embassy 
officials evaluated the potential victors in the dispute, deciding which one 
would be in America’s best interest: “If we are to influence Dominicans…
and counter leftist efforts to poison the popular mind, we must lose not 
time.”59 When Under Secretary of State Mann suggested that the U.S. 
support Balaguer, a former cohort of Trujillo, President Johnson replied, 
“Well, try to do it. Try to do it some way.”60 Of course, this ran counter to 
56 “State of the Union Address, January 4, 1965,” 1.
57  Alan McPherson, “Misled by Himself: What the Johnson Tapes Reveal About the 
Dominican Intervention of 1965.” Latin American Research Review 38, no. 2, (2003), 136.
58  Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 82; “Memorandum from Robert M. Sayre of the 
National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Dungan), October 15, 
1964,” FRUS, 1964-1968, XXXII: 42.
59  “Telegram from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, May 
21, 1964,” FRUS, 1964-1968, XXXII: 13-16.
60  Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
(Mann) and President Johnson, April 26, 1965, 63.
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Johnson’s public pronouncement that “We support no single man or any 
single group of men in the Dominican Republic.”61
There is evidence that the U.S. even orchestrated the Dominican 
request for assistance. While American officials strongly suspected 
communist involvement, evidence was insufficient to warrant an invasion. 
When Dominican Air Force Colonel Pedro Benoit emphasized the 
communist flavor of the revolt, perhaps playing to U.S. concerns that the 
Dominican Republic could become the next Cuba, he was “instructed 
what to say in order to get the U.S. troops that he wanted.”62 Instead of 
emphasizing communist gains, American officials requested that the 
colonel rephrase his request to stress that American lives were in danger. 
By the time the appropriately worded request made it to American 
officials, U.S. troops were already ashore.63
None of these facts mean that the U.S. abandoned the concept 
of or appearance of non-intervention. Even when planning intervention, 
officials were sensitive to the façade of non-intervention, and worked 
hard to portray the response as positively as possible. After news of the 
revolt, Johnson stated that, “We profoundly deplore the violence and 
disorder in the Dominican Republic. The situation is grave and we are 
following it closely. It is our hope that order can be promptly restored and 
that a peaceful settlement of the internal problems can be found.”64 Early 
statements such as these recognized the need not to appear meddlesome 
and denied aspirations to send an occupying force, but cautiously 
tested the waters. Once the decision had been made to intervene, official 
61  “Radio and Television Report to the American People…, May 2, 1965,” 473.
62  Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 84-85, 102; Draper, The Dominican Revolt, 120.
63  Dietz, “Destabilization and Intervention in Latin America,” 6; Lowenthal, The Dominican 
Intervention, 104; Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, April 28, 1965, FRUS, 1964-1968, 
XXXII: 75-76.
64  “The Presidents News Conference of April 27, 1965,” 451.
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statements were preemptively defensive. When addressing the American 
people, Johnson assured them that “even though we are deeply saddened 
by bloodshed and violence…, we had no desire to interfere in the affairs 
of a sister republic … On Wednesday afternoon, there was no longer any 
choice for the man who is your President.”65
To justify intervention, Johnson needed a valid cause. At first, the 
U.S. simply called for a cease fire and ordered the evacuation American 
citizens.66 The first wave of troops was necessary to protect Americans and 
facilitate evacuations. As proof of the necessity for U.S. troop presence, 
President Johnson affirmed to the American people that there was an 
immediate danger.67 Dominican officials had informed the American 
Embassy that “the governmental authorities could no longer protect 
us…Only an immediate landing of American forces could safeguard 
and protect the lives of thousands of Americans and thousands of other 
citizens of some 30 other countries.”68 If the U.S. were truly committed to 
non-intervention, however, the active involvement of American troops 
would be unnecessary following the evacuations of over 6,500 people 
from forty-six countries.69 To justify U.S. presence, American statements 
took a new direction, justifying U.S. occupation on the basis of preventing 
the spread of Communism. However, these statements only cautiously 
moved away from non-interventionism: “Neither we nor any other nation 
in this hemisphere can or should take it upon itself to ever interfere with 
65  “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Situation in the Dominican 
Republic, May 2, 1965,” 470.
66  “The President’s News Conference of April 27, 1965,” 451; Lyndon Johnson, “Statement 
of the President Upon Ordering Troops into the Dominican Republic, April 28, 1965,” Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Book I, 461.
67  “Statement of the President Upon Ordering Troops in the Dominican Republic, April 28, 
1965,” 461.
68  “Radio and Television Report to the American People…, May 2, 1965,” 470.
69  “Commencement Address at Baylor University, May 28, 1965,” 593.
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the affairs of [the Dominican Republic] or any other country.”70 Despite 
this admonition, Johnson asserted that intervention could become 
necessary, “only—repeat—only when the object is the establishment of a 
communistic dictatorship … So ... it is our mutual responsibility to help 
the people of the Dominican Republic toward the day when they can 
freely choose the path of liberty and justice and progress.”71 
Ever on the defensive, President Johnson constantly denied 
that American actions were imperialist or aggressive: “We are not the 
aggressor in the Dominican Republic. Forces came in there and overthrew 
that government and became aligned with evil persons who had been 
trained in overthrowing governments and…establishing Communist 
control and we have resisted that control and we have sought to 
protect our citizens against what would have taken place.”72 Not only 
were American interests at stake, but so was the future of “our sister 
Republics…and the values of all the American Republics.”73 In response to 
reporters’ questions during the subsequent occupation of the Dominican 
Republic, Johnson stated, “We didn’t start that. We didn’t intervene … We 
were not the perpetrators. But … we …took the necessary precautions.”74
A central element in this stance was to iterate that intervention 
had the sanction of numerous Latin American nations. The Organization 
of American States (OAS) was critical in this effort: “Prior to our 
intervention, we consulted and discussed the gravity of the situation there 
with 14 Latin American nations.”75 In truth, the OAS was a virtual puppet 
organization completely dominated by the United States, but its sanction 
70  “Radio and Television Report to the American People…, May 2, 1965,” 472-473.
71  Ibid., 473.
72  “Remarks to Committee Members on the Need for Additional Appropriations,” 491.
73  “Commencement Address at Baylor University, May 28, 1965,” 593.
74  Lyndon Johnson, “The President’s News Conference of June 17, 1965,” Public Papers of the 
Presidents of the United States, Book II, 678-679.
75  “The President’s News Conference of June 1, 1965,” 612.
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at least gave the appearance of multilateral support.76 The administration 
constantly drew upon language that suggested the operations had the 
sanction of the region at large. “For the first time in history,” President 
Johnson told students at Baylor University, “the Organization of 
American States has created and sent to the soil of an American nation an 
international peace-keeping military force.”77 The purpose of this force 
was to fend off forces that threatened “the principles of the inter-American 
system.”78 America was not intervening in Dominican affairs so much as 
it was fulfilling its commitment to preserve “the right of all of the free 
people of this hemisphere to choose their own course without falling prey 
to international conspiracy from any quarter.”79
The administration itself seemed unsure about why the United 
States was in the Dominican Republic. At times, President Johnson 
insisted that “99 percent of our reason for going in there was to…
provide protections for these American lives”80 But at the same news 
conference, the President also stated that “the principles of communism 
are incompatible with the principles of our inter-American system,” 
suggesting that containment was the motive.81 Were American troops in 
the Dominican Republic to prevent the spread of communism or to protect 
American citizens? It depends upon which policy was being called upon. 
Preventing the spread of communism was compatible with the Monroe 
Doctrine and Containment, but contrary to non-interventionism. Using 
American troops to protect American lives and facilitate the evacuation 
76  Dietz, “Destabilization and Intervention in Latin America and the Caribbean,” 6; 
Lowenthal, “The United States and the Dominican Republic to 1965”, 49.
77  “Commencement Address at Baylor University, May 28, 1965,” 594.
78  Lyndon Johnson, “Statement by the President on the Situation in the Dominican 
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79  Ibid., 466.
80  “The President’s News Conference of June 1, 1965,” 616.
81  Ibid., 615.
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would be permissible under the Good Neighbor Policy, but could not 
explain why soldiers were there after evacuations were complete. This 
awkward stance created an environment where President Johnson felt 
it necessary to make outrageous statements and would draw criticism 
from contemporary observers and modern historians who believe he 
deliberately misled the American people. Johnson reported that a number 
of “prime leaders in the rebel forces were men with a long history of 
communistic association… [and] had been trained by Communist forces.” 
Additionally, the President reported that there was widespread violence 
in the streets and severe damage to several embassies.82 Intervention was 
necessary “to stop the wholesale killing of hundreds and even thousands 
of Dominicans.”83
When Theodore Draper states that, “There is no doubt that 
the threat of Communism rather than danger to American lives was 
[Johnson’s] primary reason for recommending military intervention,” 
he intends the statement to be a criticism—Johnson deliberately misled 
the American people by exaggerating the influence of communists 
as an excuse to intervene. 84 But intervention based on the expansion 
of communism was justifiable in and of its own right. Draper fails to 
recognize that, although the administration did make exaggerated claims, 
there was significant, albeit circumstantial, evidence of communist 
involvement. America had committed many more troops in Korea and 
Vietnam—two nations much farther from American borders—based upon 
the policy of containment, and intervention was all the more necessary 
given the Dominican Republic’s proximity to the United States. 
82  “Remarks to Committee Members on the Need for Additional Appropriations,” 490.
83  “The President’s News Conference of June 1, 1965,” 611.
84  Draper, The Dominican Revolt, 122, 159-169.
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In the dark mist of conflict and violence, revolution and confusion, it is not easy to 
find clear and unclouded truth.85
Historical interpretations of U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic 
in 1965 can be grouped into two categories. The first are stalwart 
supporters of U.S. actions as a justified measure to contain the spread of 
communism. The second group can be considered outspoken critics of 
a neo-imperialistic attempt by the U.S. to influence a tiny nation on its 
periphery which it deemed incapable of self-government.86 Neither of 
these viewpoints provides an accurate and unbiased evaluation of the 
events. Each side assumes a conspiratorial element, either carried out by 
the U.S. government or by communist operatives. Evidence of either is 
scant.
 Ultimately, Dominican intervention was “the natural consequence 
of the attitudes and assumptions with which American officials generally 
approached the Dominican Republic.”87 In the climate of the Cold War, 
American concerns about the spread of communism were in a heightened 
state. Conditions in the Dominican Republic were ripe for a communist 
uprising, and movements that smacked of socialism were not unknown 
there. When the revolt began, numerous organizations joined, many of 
which had expressed socialist ideas. The very leader whom the rebels 
wanted to reinstate had been suspected of being soft on communism. 
Under these circumstances, the slightest evidence of communist plot was 
taken as undeniable proof. This “gap between Dominican realities and 
American perceptions” determined the path that the U.S. would take.88 
85  “Radio and Television Report to the American People…, May 2, 1965,” 470.
86  Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, 191; Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 132-135.
87  Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 150.
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American actions were coherent, logical, and consistent with the policy 
of containment and the Monroe Doctrine.89 The U.S. could not risk delay. 
To quote President Johnson out of context, “In this situation delay itself 
would be decision—the decision to risk and lose the lives of thousands of 
Americans and thousands of innocent people from all lands.”90
 But sending troops into an independent “sister Republic” 
based on such flimsy evidence was unacceptable. Such behavior was 
discordant with the principles of the Good Neighbor Policy. To rectify 
this, U.S. officials orchestrated a statement to the effect that American 
lives were in danger from Dominican officials whose status as true 
representatives of the Dominican government was questionable at best. 
This statement provided justification for the initial deployment, putting 
American resources in position for further operations and buying time 
for the administration to jump through the verbal hurdles created by 
incompatible policy statements.
Intervention in 1965 should not have been surprising to anyone 
familiar with the long-term diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and 
Dominican Republic.91 In the long history of U.S.-Dominican relations, 
intervention was the rule rather than the exception. “Throughout almost 
two centuries of United States-Latin American relations, one must 
conclude that the U.S. has exercised political and economic dominance…
Latin American states usually have been in a subordinate and dependent 
role. Cold War years have seen strong reaction to real and alleged 
communist penetration.”92 The absurd attempt to maintain the image of 
adherence to the Good Neighbor Policy complicated matters, and the 
89  Gleijeses, The Dominican Revolt, 182.
90  “Radio and Television Report to the American People…, May 2, 1965,” 471.
91  Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 7, 15.
92  Kamman, “U.S.-Latin American Relations,” 25.
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inaccuracies of President Johnson’s public pronouncements have served 
as fodder for his critics. In the attempt to appear to be a Good Neighbor, 
the administration was forced to make bold and, at times, inaccurate 
statements. 
Despite efforts to spin the information to fit into policy molds, 
the U.S. decision to intervene stemmed directly from a fear of communist 
takeover. Ultimately, anti-communist stability was more important than 
democracy or non-interventionism in the Dominican Republic.93 The 
men responsible for the United States’ response to the Dominican crisis 
“believed themselves [to be] engaged in an international struggle against 
Communism, and…had just committed themselves to an expanded war in 
Asia [on that basis.]”94 
One rebel participant downplayed America’s concern about 
communist elements in the Dominican revolt. American diplomats, said 
General Caamaño, “have Communists on the brain.”95 It is true that 
many of the reports of communist activities were exaggerated by the 
administration at the time, but these embellishments have had the effect of 
discrediting communist involvement altogether. Since it is known that the 
administration overstated the facts, it has been assumed that the existence 
of communist operatives was fabricated. This is a misinterpretation. 
The exaggerations were not totally fictitious. The facts were embellished 
because the evidence at hand was circumstantial. The CIA, in a document 
that is still predominantly classified, asserted that “the prospect at the time 
of U.S. intervention clearly was one in which a movement increasingly 
under the influence of Castroites and other Communists was threatening 
93  Slater, Intervention and Negotiation, 31; Gleijeses, The Dominican Crisis, 284.
94  Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention, 152.
95  General Francisco Caamaño, quoted in Draper, The Dominican Revolt, 90. Caamaño’s 
dismissal of the idea that communists were involved in the revolt should be subject to some 
scrutiny, as Caamaño later fled to Cuba to lead a guerilla group.
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to gain the ascendancy in the Dominican Republic.”96 Of the writers 
who have commentated on the matter, those who generally distrust this 
assertion are either journalists or rebel participants. The journalists lacked 
access to internal information and based much of their interpretation 
on interviews conducted with rebels. Rebel participants seething with 
discontent, whose efforts were thwarted by the U.S. intervention, have 
been reluctant to admit the extent of communist involvement, as that 
might mar the noble effort to restore a constitutional leader that they 
portrayed.97 American officials who have written on the subject, such 
as Ambassador Martin, on the other hand, had access to documentary 
evidence that has since been declared confidential, but have much to lose 
by admitting any transgressions on the part of the United States. Perhaps 
the truth can only be ascertained when all documents have been released, 
but until then, historians must make do with the evidence available.
96  “Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, May 7, 1965,” 139.
97  See Pons, The Dominican Republic.
